Lessons from the French Exception: How Firms Choose between Unitary and Dual Boards

@article{Belot2012LessonsFT,
  title={Lessons from the French Exception: How Firms Choose between Unitary and Dual Boards},
  author={F. Belot and Edith Ginglinger and M. Slovin and Marie E. Sushka},
  journal={Econometric Modeling: Corporate Finance & Governance eJournal},
  year={2012}
}
Many governance reform proposals focus on strengthening board monitoring. In contrast, Adams and Ferreira (2007) and Harris and Raviv (2008) conclude that a passive board is often optimal. We examine determinants of board structure choice in France, where firms are free to choose between a unitary (passive) board and a dual (monitoring) board. We find firms with greater asymmetric information are likely to adopt a unitary board. Firms with a high potential for private benefit extraction are… Expand
2 Citations

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