Lessons from the French Exception: How Firms Choose between Unitary and Dual Boards

@inproceedings{Belot2012LessonsFT,
  title={Lessons from the French Exception: How Firms Choose between Unitary and Dual Boards},
  author={François Belot and Edith Ginglinger and Myron B. Slovin and Marie Elizabeth Sushka},
  year={2012}
}
Many governance reform proposals focus on strengthening board monitoring. In contrast, Adams and Ferreira (2007) and Harris and Raviv (2008) conclude that a passive board is often optimal. We examine determinants of board structure choice in France, where firms are free to choose between a unitary (passive) board and a dual (monitoring) board. We find firms with greater asymmetric information are likely to adopt a unitary board. Firms with a high potential for private benefit extraction are… CONTINUE READING

Tables from this paper.

References

Publications referenced by this paper.
SHOWING 1-10 OF 54 REFERENCES

The Costs of Intense Board Monitoring.

Faleye, Olubunmi, Rani Hoitash, Udi Hoitash
  • Journal of Financial Economics,
  • 2010
VIEW 6 EXCERPTS
HIGHLY INFLUENTIAL

Are all inside directors the same? Do they entrench CEOs or facilitate more informed board decisions?

Masulis, W Ronald, Shawn Mobbs
  • Journal of Finance,
  • 2010

Behind the Scenes: The Corporate Governance Preferences of Institutional Investors

JOSEPH A. McCAHERY, ZACHARIAS SAUTNER, LAURA T. STARKS
  • 2009

A theory of board control and size.

Harris, Milton, Artur Raviv
  • Review of Financial Studies
  • 2008