Less is Better: When Low-Value Options are Valued More Highly than High-Value Options

  title={Less is Better: When Low-Value Options are Valued More Highly than High-Value Options},
  author={Christopher K. Hsee},
  • C. Hsee
  • Published 1 June 1998
  • Psychology
This research demonstrates a less-is-better effect in three contexts: (1) a person giving a $45 scarf as a gift was perceived to be more generous than one giving a $55 coat; (2) an overfilled ice cream serving with 7 oz of ice cream was valued more than an underfilled serving with 8 oz of ice cream; (3) a dinnerware set with 24 intact pieces was judged more favourably than one with 31 intact pieces (including the same 24) plus a few broken ones. This less-is-better effect occurred only when the… 
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