Leibnizian Rejection of Standard Thought Experiments against Identity of Indiscernibles

@article{Maunu2015LeibnizianRO,
  title={Leibnizian Rejection of Standard Thought Experiments against Identity of Indiscernibles},
  author={Ari Maunu},
  journal={Metaphysica},
  year={2015},
  volume={16},
  pages={189 - 193}
}
Abstract It is argued that from a genuine Leibnizian point of view the well-known thought experiment, call it BTE, involving a possible world with only two exactly similar objects, cannot be used to refute Leibniz’s principle of the identity of indiscernibles (LIdI). If the claim that there are two objects in BTE is based on primitive thisnesses, the Leibnizian objection is that there are no such things; and even if there were, then, quite generally, something true of one object – that it has… Expand

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