Legislative override and particularistic bills in unstable democracies: Ecuador in comparative perspective

@article{BasabeSerrano2020LegislativeOA,
  title={Legislative override and particularistic bills in unstable democracies: Ecuador in comparative perspective},
  author={Santiago Basabe-Serrano and Sergio Huertas-Hern{\'a}ndez},
  journal={The Journal of Legislative Studies},
  year={2020},
  volume={27},
  pages={266 - 284}
}
ABSTRACT This article addresses, in a comparative perspective, the conditions under which legislatures find greater incentives to overcome a presidential veto. The authors’ framework points out that the legislative override is used selectively, essentially when the presidential veto is in particularistic bills, and in the context of unstable democracies. To test their theoretical argument the authors used an unpublished database on bills processed in Ecuador between 1979 and 2019. Though… 

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