Legislative Coalitions in a Bargaining Model with Externalities

@inproceedings{Calvert2005LegislativeCI,
  title={Legislative Coalitions in a Bargaining Model with Externalities},
  author={Randall L. Calvert and Nathan Dietz},
  year={2005}
}
Previous work modeling a legislature in which bill proposals and voting take a form analogous to offer-counteroffer bargaining offer a new view of what legislative parties are and why they are formed. However, such models either represent preferences as being purely distributive in nature, so that there are no variations in preference similarity across legislators and thus no reason for any particular group of legislators to form a party; or else used a full spatial model of legislative… CONTINUE READING

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