Legal conflicts of interest of the revolving door

@article{Brezis2017LegalCO,
  title={Legal conflicts of interest of the revolving door},
  author={Elise S. Brezis},
  journal={Journal of Macroeconomics},
  year={2017},
  volume={52},
  pages={175-188}
}

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