Legal Corruption

  title={Legal Corruption},
  author={D. Kaufmann and Pedro Vicente},
We challenge the conventional definition of corruption through the analysis of legal forms of corruption, and by devoting special attention to influence induced by the private sector. This paper studies the determinants of the world pattern of legal and illegal corruption by proposing a simple theoretical model of endogenous corruption and related legal framework, and its thorough empirical test. Three types of equilibrium outcomes are identified: one based on illegal corruption, where the… CONTINUE READING


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