Left temporoparietal junction is necessary for representing someone else's belief

  title={Left temporoparietal junction is necessary for representing someone else's belief},
  author={Dana Samson and Ian A. Apperly and Claudia Chiavarino and Glyn W. Humphreys},
  journal={Nature Neuroscience},
A standard view in the neuroscience literature is that the frontal lobes sustain our ability to process others' mental states such as beliefs, intentions and desires (this ability is often referred to as having 'theory of mind'). Here we report evidence from brain-damaged patients showing that, in addition to involvement of the frontal lobes, the left temporoparietal junction is necessary for reasoning about the beliefs of others. 
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