Learning in and about Games

  title={Learning in and about Games},
  author={Anke Gerber},
We study learning in finitely repeated 2× 2 normal form games, when players have incomplete information about their opponents’ payoffs. In a laboratory experiment we investigate whether players (a) learn the game they are playing, (b) learn to predict the behavior of their opponent, and (c) learn to play according to a Nash equilibrium of the repeated game. Our results show that the success in learning the opponent’s type depends on the characteristics of the true game. The learning success is… CONTINUE READING
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