Learning in Random Utility Models Via Online Decision Problems

@article{Melo2021LearningIR,
  title={Learning in Random Utility Models Via Online Decision Problems},
  author={Emerson Melo},
  journal={ArXiv},
  year={2021},
  volume={abs/2112.10993}
}
  • E. Melo
  • Published 21 December 2021
  • Economics, Computer Science
  • ArXiv
. This paper studies the Random Utility Model (RUM) in a repeated stochastic choice situation, in which the decision maker is imperfectly informed about the payoffs associated to each of the available alternatives. By embedding the RUM into an online decision problem, we develop a gradient-based learning algorithm and establish that a large class of RUMs are Hannan consistent (Hannan [1957]); that is, the average difference between the expected payoffs generated by a RUM and that of the best fixed… 

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    Economic Theory
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