• Corpus ID: 239768672

Learning in Multi-Stage Decentralized Matching Markets

  title={Learning in Multi-Stage Decentralized Matching Markets},
  author={Xiaowu Dai and Michael I. Jordan},
  booktitle={Neural Information Processing Systems},
Matching markets are often organized in a multi-stage and decentralized manner. Moreover, participants in real-world matching markets often have uncertain preferences. This article develops a framework for learning optimal strategies in such settings, based on a nonparametric statistical approach and variational analysis. We propose an efficient algorithm, built upon concepts of “lower uncertainty bound” and “calibrated decentralized matching,” for maximizing the participants’ expected payoff… 

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