Learning aspiration in repeated games


We study infinitely repeated symmetric 2×2 games played by bounded rational agents who follow a simple rule of thumb: each agent continues to play the same action if the current payoff exceeds the average of the past payoffs, and switches to the other action with a positive probability otherwise. By applying the stochastic approximation technique, we… (More)
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2004.12.001



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@article{Cho2005LearningAI, title={Learning aspiration in repeated games}, author={In-Koo Cho and Akihiko Matsui}, journal={J. Economic Theory}, year={2005}, volume={124}, pages={171-201} }