Learning What is Similar: Precedents and Equilibrium Selection

  title={Learning What is Similar: Precedents and Equilibrium Selection},
  author={Rossella Argenziano and I. Gilboa},
  journal={HEC Paris Research Paper Series},
We argue that a precedent is important not only because it changes the relative frequency of a certain event, making it positive rather than zero, but also because it changes the way that relative frequencies are weighed. Specifically, agents assess probabilities of future events based on past occurrences, where not all of these occurrences are deemed equally relevant. More similar cases are weighed more heavily than less similar ones. Importantly, the similarity function is also learnt from… Expand
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