Corpus ID: 83458767

Learning Reciprocity in Complex Sequential Social Dilemmas

  title={Learning Reciprocity in Complex Sequential Social Dilemmas},
  author={Tom Eccles and E. Hughes and J{\'a}nos Kram{\'a}r and S. Wheelwright and Joel Z. Leibo},
  • Tom Eccles, E. Hughes, +2 authors Joel Z. Leibo
  • Published 2019
  • Computer Science
  • ArXiv
  • Reciprocity is an important feature of human social interaction and underpins our cooperative nature. What is more, simple forms of reciprocity have proved remarkably resilient in matrix game social dilemmas. Most famously, the tit-for-tat strategy performs very well in tournaments of Prisoner's Dilemma. Unfortunately this strategy is not readily applicable to the real world, in which options to cooperate or defect are temporally and spatially extended. Here, we present a general online… CONTINUE READING
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