Corpus ID: 211258809

Learning From Strategic Agents: Accuracy, Improvement, and Causality

  title={Learning From Strategic Agents: Accuracy, Improvement, and Causality},
  author={Yonadav Shavit and Benjamin L. Edelman and Brian Axelrod},
In many predictive decision-making scenarios, such as credit scoring and academic testing, a decision-maker must construct a model (predicting some outcome) that accounts for agents' incentives to "game" their features in order to receive better decisions. Whereas the strategic classification literature generally assumes that agents' outcomes are not causally dependent on their features (and thus strategic behavior is a form of lying), we join concurrent work in modeling agents' outcomes as a… Expand
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