Leaders should not be conformists in evolutionary social dilemmas

  title={Leaders should not be conformists in evolutionary social dilemmas},
  author={A. Szolnoki and M. Perc},
  journal={Scientific Reports},
  • A. Szolnoki, M. Perc
  • Published 2016
  • Computer Science, Medicine, Physics, Biology
  • Scientific Reports
  • The most common assumption in evolutionary game theory is that players should adopt a strategy that warrants the highest payoff. However, recent studies indicate that the spatial selection for cooperation is enhanced if an appropriate fraction of the population chooses the most common rather than the most profitable strategy within the interaction range. Such conformity might be due to herding instincts or crowd behavior in humans and social animals. In a heterogeneous population where… CONTINUE READING
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