Leader survival and purges after a failed coup d’état

  title={Leader survival and purges after a failed coup d’{\'e}tat},
  author={Malcolm R. Easton and Randolph M. Siverson},
  journal={Journal of Peace Research},
  pages={596 - 608}
What factors explain variation in the tenure of political leaders who survive a coup d’état? Our main hypothesis is that leaders who survive a coup attempt take the opportunity to purge known and potential rivals while also deterring future coup conspirators. The severity of the purge is also hypothesized to be positively associated with longer post-coup tenures, as potential rivals are eliminated or deterred from future coup attempts. After introducing the topic of the failed coup, and… 

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