Leader survival and purges after a failed coup d’état

  title={Leader survival and purges after a failed coup d’{\'e}tat},
  author={Malcolm R. Easton and Randolph M. Siverson},
  journal={Journal of Peace Research},
  pages={596 - 608}
What factors explain variation in the tenure of political leaders who survive a coup d’état? Our main hypothesis is that leaders who survive a coup attempt take the opportunity to purge known and potential rivals while also deterring future coup conspirators. The severity of the purge is also hypothesized to be positively associated with longer post-coup tenures, as potential rivals are eliminated or deterred from future coup attempts. After introducing the topic of the failed coup, and… 

Tables from this paper

Coups, regime transitions, and institutional consequences
Abstract Coups and regime transitions are events that typically are intended to change the basic institutional framework of a country. Which specific institutions change and the consequences of these
The Morning After: Cabinet Instability and the Purging of Ministers after Failed Coup Attempts in Autocracies
Autocrats rely on inner-circle elites to stay in power. It is commonly assumed that dictators will purge these elites if they unsuccessfully try to unseat the dictator in a coup. However, this
Purging militaries: Introducing the Military Purges in Dictatorships (MPD) dataset
The principal threat most autocratic leaders face stems from within the regime. To control militaries and mitigate the risk of coups d’état, many autocratic leaders repeatedly purge strong officers
The Urge to Purge: Forecasting Erdogan’s Political Survival Following the Failed Coup
Drawing upon earlier research on the post failed coup survival of political leaders, we offer an ex ante in sample estimate of the likely political survival of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan
Coups, Regime Transitions, and Institutional Change
Coups and regime transitions are events that typically are intended to change the basic institutional framework of a country. Which specific policies change and the consequences of these changes
Who Is Purged? Determinants of Elite Purges in North Korea
The existing literature on elite purges in dictatorships claims that the risk of coups to replace dictators is the main cause of the dictator’s choice of purge strategy. Why then do elite purges
Differences Matter: The Effect of Coup Types on Physical Integrity Rights
What is the effect of coups d’etat on repression? Do democracy-inducing, ‘good’ coups increase respect for physical integrity rights? Does it make a difference whether a coup d’etat is staged by the
Determinants of political purges in autocracies: Evidence from ancient Chinese dynasties
Why would dictators purge members of their ruling coalition? Some argue that doing so can minimize the risk to dictators’ political survival, while others contend that dictators who mount purges are
To Purge or Not to Purge? An Individual-Level Quantitative Analysis of Elite Purges in Dictatorships
Why do dictators purge specific elites but not others? And why do dictators purge these elites in certain ways? Examining these related questions helps us understand not only how dictators retain


Coup risk, coup-proofing and leader survival
Under what conditions do political leaders enact ‘coup-proofing’ strategies? There is a broad consensus in the literature that political leaders who face a higher risk of a coup will employ
Determinants of the Attempting and Outcome of Coups d’état
Previous studies have attested to leaders “coup-proofing” their regimes by reducing the ability or disposition of their armies to seek their removal. The following article tests the utility of these
War and the Survival of Political Leaders: A Comparative Study of Regime Types and Political Accountability
We seek to answer the question, What effect does international war participation have on the ability of political leaders to survive in office? We develop a model of political reliability and derive
Loyalty for sale? Military spending and coups d’etat
Coups d’etat continue to be common around the world, often leading to changes in leaders and institutions. We examine the relationship between military spending and coups and find that (i) successful
Strategic Logic of Elite Purges in Dictatorships
Why do some leaders eliminate rivals from authoritarian regimes and therefore diminish elites’ capabilities to remove them via coup, while others do not? By examining both dictators’ incentives and
International Conflict and the Tenure of Leaders: Is War Still Ex Post Inefficient?
Recent work in comparative politics and international relations has shown a marked shift toward leaders as the theoretical unit of analysis. In most of the new theoretical models a core assumption is
Toward a Structural Understanding of Coup Risk
Although coup risk plays an important role in theories of war, revolution, and democratization, scholars have not developed a rigorous conceptualization and valid measure of the concept. We develop a
Military purges and the recurrence of civil conflict
Literature on coup-proofing often suggests that such activities reduce military effectiveness, which could provide an environment ripe for civil conflict. However, if coup-proofing is dangerous, why
Coup d’État and Democracy
This article explains coup activity in democracies by adapting insights from the literature on commitment problems and framing coup around the threats leaders and potential coup plotters pose to each
Coup Risk, Counterbalancing, and International Conflict
Contrary to the literature on rallies-around-the-flag, this article argues that, in some circumstances, leaders may use international conflict to promote domestic divisiveness. More specifically, the