• Corpus ID: 147694744

Law and the Sciences of the Brain/Mind

@article{Morse2016LawAT,
  title={Law and the Sciences of the Brain/Mind},
  author={Stephen J. Morse},
  journal={CJRN: Criminal Mind \& Behavior (Topic)},
  year={2016}
}
  • S. Morse
  • Published 20 April 2016
  • Law
  • CJRN: Criminal Mind & Behavior (Topic)
This chapter is a submission to the Oxford Handbook of Law and the Regulation of Technology edited by Roger Brownsword. It considers whether the new sciences of the brain/mind, especially neuroscience and behavioral genetics, are likely to transform the law’s traditional concepts of the person, agency and responsibility. The chapter begins with a brief speculation about why so many people think these sciences will transform the law. After reviewing the law’s concepts, misguided challenges to… 
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