• Corpus ID: 55543319

Law and the Future: Trade Regulation

  title={Law and the Future: Trade Regulation},
  author={Aaron Director and Edward Hirsch Levi},
  journal={Northwestern University Law Review},

Combinatorial Auctions in Practice

This work describes the key representational, computational, and economic aspects of deployed combinatorial auctions and discusses behavioral economics considerations on both sides of the market, and the interrelated topics of trust, simplicity and flexibility.

“On a Level with Dentists?” Reflections on the Evolution of Industrial Organization

This essay provides a brief overview of the evolution of the field of industrial organization from its emergence to the present, and it offers some observations about the present state of the field.

Naked Exclusion in the Lab: The Case of Sequential Contracting

In the context of the naked exclusion model of Rasmusen, Ramseyer and Wiley (1991) and Segal and Whinston (2000b), we examine whether sequential contracting is more conducive to exclusion in the lab,

When low is no good: Predatory pricing and U.S. antitrust law (1950–1980)

Abstract The paper deals with the history of the antitrust offence of predatory pricing in U.S. antitrust law. Despite being considered so serious a violation to deserve a per se condemnation,

Nonlinear Supply Contracts, Exclusive Dealing, and Equilibrium Market Foreclosure

We examine how the feasibility of both nonlinear pricing and exclusive dealing arrangements affect incentives for market foreclosure when two manufacturers contract with a retail monopolist.

Insurance , Vertical Restraints and Competition

Exclusionary Vertical Restraints and Antitrust: Experimental Law and Economics Contributions

Vertical restraints have been subject of lively policy and academic discussions. Scholars associated with the Chicago School challenged early foreclosure doctrines by arguing that vertical restraints

When Economics Met Antitrust: The Second Chicago School and the Economization of Antitrust Law

In this article, the authors interrogate legal and economic history to analyze the process by which the Chicago School of Antitrust emerged in the 1950s and became dominant in the United States. They

Tying in Markets with Network E⁄ects (cid:3)

We develop a leverage theory of tying in markets with network e⁄ects. When a monopolist in one market cannot fully extract the whole surplus from consumers, tying can be a mechanism through which the

On the Virginia school of antitrust: Competition policy, law & economics and public choice

  • W. Shughart
  • Economics, Political Science
    Public Choice
  • 2022
Competition policy (antitrust policy in the United States) engages the subfields of microeconomics (price theory), industrial organization, law and economics, and public choice. The last was a