Large pulse attack as a method of conventional optical eavesdropping in quantum cryptography

@article{Vakhitov2001LargePA,
  title={Large pulse attack as a method of conventional optical eavesdropping in quantum cryptography},
  author={Artem Vakhitov and Vadim Makarov and Dag Roar Hjelme},
  journal={Journal of Modern Optics},
  year={2001},
  volume={48},
  pages={2023 - 2038}
}
Abstract In this paper so-called ‘large pulse attack’ is investigated. This attack is one of the possible methods of conventional optical eavesdropping, a new strategy of eavesdropping on quantum cryptosystems, which eliminates the need of immediate interaction with transmitted quantum states. It allows the eavesdropper to avoid inducing transmission errors that disclose her presence to the legal users. As an object of the eavesdropping, phase-state fibre optic schemes are considered. With… 

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