Large Shareholders and Corporate Control

@article{Shleifer1986LargeSA,
  title={Large Shareholders and Corporate Control},
  author={Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny},
  journal={Journal of Political Economy},
  year={1986},
  volume={94},
  pages={461 - 488}
}
In a corporation with many small owners, it may not pay any one of them to monitor the performance of the management. We explore a model in which the presence of a large minority shareholder provides a partial solution to this free-rider problem. The model sheds light on the following questions: Under what circumstances will we observe a tender offer as opposed to a proxy fight or an internal management shake-up? How strong are the forces pushing toward increasing concentration of ownership of… 

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