Corpus ID: 55337768

Labour Disputes and the Game of Legal Representation

  title={Labour Disputes and the Game of Legal Representation},
  author={H. Fraisse},
  journal={Microeconomics: Welfare Economics & Collective Decision-Making eJournal},
  • H. Fraisse
  • Published 2010
  • Political Science
  • Microeconomics: Welfare Economics & Collective Decision-Making eJournal
  • This paper explores the prisoner’s dilemma that may result when workers and firms are involved in labour disputes and must decide whether to hire a lawyer to be represented at trial. Using a representative data set of labour disputes in the UK and a large population of French unfair dismissal cases, we find that a lawyer substantially increases the firm’s probability of winning at trial but has little effect on the worker’s victory probability. The UK data contain award and litigation costs and… CONTINUE READING
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