author={Fabrice Correia},
  journal={The Review of Symbolic Logic},
  pages={31 - 59}
  • F. Correia
  • Published 4 November 2013
  • Philosophy
  • The Review of Symbolic Logic
The view that some facts obtain in virtue of other facts is both natural and plausible. Causal examples come to mind: if an event e caused an event f , then it sounds correct to say that the fact that f occurred obtains in virtue of the fact that e occurred—or, to put it in a less cumbersome way, that f occurred because e occurred. But many noncausal cases also come to mind, as illustrated, for example, by the following statements: • These two apples resemble each other because they have the… 

Singular troubles with singleton socrates

Some facts obtain in virtue of other facts, which may then be said to ground the former. Many important metaphysical questions concern matters of ground: whether normative facts are grounded by

On ground and consequence

An alternative notion of logical consequence, based on the idea of grounding, is developed, which aims to capture certain aspects of the pre-theoretical understanding of consequence.

Token-Reflexivity and Repetition

The classical rule of Repetition says that if you take any sentence as a premise, and repeat it as a conclusion, you have a valid argument. It’s a very basic rule of logic, and many other rules

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It is argued that there is at least one form of rigid ontological dependence that is sufficient for non-factive grounding, and that a form of generic dependence may be necessary (but not sufficient) both for factive and non- factive grounding.

Grounding the normative: a problem for structured non-naturalism

Many non-naturalists about the normative want to endorse the view that some normative facts hold in virtue of both non-normative facts and normative principles. In this paper, I argue that

Logical Pluralism and Interpretations of Logical Systems

Logical pluralism is a general idea that there is more than one correct logic. Carnielli and Rodrigues [2019a] defend an epistemic interpretation of the paraconsistent logic N4, according to which an

A grounding-based measure of relative fundamentality

An account of the metaphysical hierarchy that assigns to each fact a set of ordinals representing the levels on which it occurs is developed and defended, allowing one to compare any two facts with respect to their fundamentality.

What is Wrong with Self-Grounding?

Many philosophers embrace grounding, supposedly a central notion of metaphysics. Grounding is widely assumed to be irreflexive, but recently a number of authors have questioned this assumption:

Formal explanations as logical derivations

According to a longstanding philosophical tradition dating back to Aristotle, certain proofs do not only certify the truth of their conclusion but also explain it. Lately, much effort is being

From ontic structural realism to metaphysical coherentism

The present paper argues that the typical structuralist claims according to which invariances, symmetries and the like are fundamental – especially in physics – should not be understood in terms of



Metaphysical Dependence: Grounding and Reduction

This essay is a plea for ideological toleration. Philosophers are right to be fussy about the words they use, especially in metaphysics where bad vocabulary has been a source of grief down through

What Truth Depends on

A theory of dependence is introduced according to which a sentence φ is said to depend on a set Φ of sentences iff the truth value of φ supervenes on the presence or absence of the sentences of Φ in/from the extension of the truth predicate.

Some Puzzles of Ground

  • K. Fine
  • Philosophy
    Notre Dame J. Formal Log.
  • 2010
The conflict, far from serving to undermine the concept of ground, serves to show how important it is to arriving at a satisfactory view of what in logic, as in other areas of thought, can properly be taken to be hold.

Grounding and Truth-Functions

(1) Mental facts obtain in virtue of neurophysiological facts; (2) Dispositional properties are grounded in categorical properties; (3) Legal facts are grounded in non-legal, e.g. social, facts; (4)

An Introduction to Grounding

Consider the fact that there was a global economic recession in 2008. A causal explanation of this fact specifies facts that were causally responsible for the economic meltdown or facts on which the

Model theory for modal logic part I—The De re/de dicto distinction

  • K. Fine
  • Philosophy
    J. Philos. Log.
  • 1978
The aim in these papers has been to bring the methods of model theory closer to certain common philosophical concerns in modal logic, and most of the results answer questions that arise from some definite philosophical position.


A logic for ‘because’ is developed based on systematic connections between ‘ because’ and the truth-functional connectives.

Outline of a Theory of Truth

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  • K. Fine
  • Philosophy
    The Review of Symbolic Logic
  • 2011
A system of structural rules for various notions of ground and establish soundness and completeness are laid down.