Corpus ID: 201030016

LEBANESE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY THE EFFECT OF CEO OWNERSHIP AND CEO ENTRENCHMENT ON FIRM VALUE

@inproceedings{Hallak2011LEBANESEAU,
  title={LEBANESE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY THE EFFECT OF CEO OWNERSHIP AND CEO ENTRENCHMENT ON FIRM VALUE},
  author={Waddah Hallak},
  year={2011}
}
We investigate the relation between firm value, CEO equity ownership and managerial entrenchment. Our results concerning the coefficients and their respective signs are consistent with the existing literature. However, there is no evidence of a specific nonmonotonic relation between Tobin’s Q and percentage of CEO equity ownership. This paper also examines the marginal impact of investment spending on capital and research on firm value under different governance schemes. Though the sign and… Expand
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