Kompromat: A theory of blackmail as a system of governance

  title={Kompromat: A theory of blackmail as a system of governance},
  author={James P. Choy},
  journal={Journal of Development Economics},
  • James P. Choy
  • Published 13 August 2020
  • Economics
  • Journal of Development Economics

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