Knowledge of consequences: an explanation of the epistemic side-effect effect

@article{PaprzyckaHausman2018KnowledgeOC,
  title={Knowledge of consequences: an explanation of the epistemic side-effect effect},
  author={Katarzyna Paprzycka-Hausman},
  journal={Synthese},
  year={2018},
  volume={197},
  pages={5457-5490}
}
The Knobe effect (Analysis 63(3):190–194, 2003a ) consists in our tendency to attribute intentionality to bringing about a side effect when it is morally bad but not when it is morally good. Beebe and Buckwalter (Mind Lang 25:474–498, 2010 ) have demonstrated that there is an epistemic side-effect effect (ESEE): people are more inclined to attribute knowledge when the side effect is bad in Knobe-type cases. ESEE is quite robust. In this paper, I present a new explanation of ESEE. I argue that… 
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