• Corpus ID: 43946220

Knowledge before belief : Response-times indicate evaluations of knowledge prior to belief

@inproceedings{Phillips2017KnowledgeBB,
  title={Knowledge before belief : Response-times indicate evaluations of knowledge prior to belief},
  author={Jonathan Scott Phillips and Joshua Knobe and Brent Strickland and Pauline Armary and Fiery Andrews Cushman},
  year={2017}
}
In a series of studies, we investigate the relationship between evaluations of knowledge and belief in human adult theory of mind, and provide evidence that evaluations of knowledge do not dependent on belief. Study 1 finds that people can accurately evaluate others’ knowledge before they can accurately evaluate their beliefs. Study 2 demonstrates that this pattern cannot be not explained by pragmatic differences. Study 3 illustrates that pattern occurs cross-linguistically and unlikely to be… 

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