Knowledge Isn’t Closed on Saturday: A Study in Ordinary Language

@article{Buckwalter2010KnowledgeIC,
  title={Knowledge Isn’t Closed on Saturday: A Study in Ordinary Language},
  author={Wesley Buckwalter},
  journal={Review of Philosophy and Psychology},
  year={2010},
  volume={1},
  pages={395-406}
}
Recent theories of epistemic contextualism have challenged traditional invariantist positions in epistemology by claiming that the truth conditions of knowledge attributions fluctuate between conversational contexts. Contextualists often garner support for this view by appealing to folk intuitions regarding ordinary knowledge practices. Proposed is an experiment designed to test the descriptive conditions upon which these types of contextualist defenses rely. In the cases tested, the folk… Expand
Knowledge and Disagreement
Epistemic contextualism holds that the content of a knowledge sentence of the form ‘S knows that P’ is context sensitive. This view respects the context sensitivity of ordinary speakers’ use ofExpand
Normative scorekeeping
TLDR
This paper argues that the focus on salience relations is a mistake, and defends the view that the relevant features of context are facts about what error-possibilities and alternatives those in the context have a reason to consider. Expand
Epistemic Contextualism: An Idle Hypothesis
ABSTRACT Epistemic contextualism is one of the most hotly debated topics in contemporary epistemology. Contextualists claim that ‘know’ is a context-sensitive verb associated with differentExpand
Practical Interests, Relevant Alternatives, and Knowledge Attributions: an Empirical Study
TLDR
It is argued that the data impugn what both Stanley and Schaffer claim the authors' common-sense judgments about such cases are, and it is indicated that neither raising the possibility of error nor raising stakes moves most people from attributing knowledge to denying it. Expand
Third‐person knowledge ascriptions: A crucial experiment for contextualism
In the past few years there has been a turn towards evaluating the empirical foundation of epistemic contextualism using formal (rather than armchair) experimental methods. By-and-large, the resultsExpand
Knowledge in Context: The Factivity Principle and Its Epistemological Consequences
The traditional analysis of the notion of knowledge seems to neglect that although we gather many of our beliefs under the flag of “knowledge” we do not always employ the same standards to bestowExpand
Epistemic Contextualism: A Normative Approach
In his Knowledge and Practical Interests Jason Stanley argues that the view he defends, which he calls interest-relative invariantism, is better supported by certain cases than epistemicExpand
TIME CONSTRAINTS AND PRAGMATIC ENCROACHMENT ON KNOWLEDGE
Abstract Citing some recent experimental findings, I argue for the surprising claim that in some cases the less time you have the more you know. More specifically, I present some evidence to suggestExpand
Knowledge embedded
TLDR
It is argued that pragmatic invariantists have no principled account of embedded occurrences of ‘S knows/doesn’t know that p’: Occurrences embedded within larger linguistic constructions such as conditional sentences, attitude verbs, expressions of probability, comparatives, and many others give rise to a threefold problem of embedded implicatures. Expand
Does Contextualism Hinge on a Methodological Dispute
Epistemic contextualism (henceforth: contextualism) is, roughly, the semantic thesis that the truthconditional contribution of “knows” vary with variations in the context of utterance. ContextualismExpand
...
1
2
3
4
5
...

References

SHOWING 1-10 OF 18 REFERENCES
Practical Interests, Relevant Alternatives, and Knowledge Attributions: an Empirical Study
TLDR
It is argued that the data impugn what both Stanley and Schaffer claim the authors' common-sense judgments about such cases are, and it is indicated that neither raising the possibility of error nor raising stakes moves most people from attributing knowledge to denying it. Expand
Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions
In this paper we propose to argue for two claims. The first is that a sizeable group of epistemological projects – a group which includes much of what has been done in epistemology in the analyticExpand
Now You Know It, Now You Don’t
"Contextualism" will here refer to the position that the truth-conditions knowledge-ascribing and knowledge-denying sentences (sentences of the form "S knows that P" and "S doesn't know that P" andExpand
Contextualism and Skepticism
In the good old days, a large part of the debate about skepticism focused on the quality of the reasons we have for believing propositions of various types. Skeptics about knowledge in a given domainExpand
Folk concepts and intuitions: from philosophy to cognitive science
  • Shaun Nichols
  • Medicine, Psychology
  • Trends in Cognitive Sciences
  • 2004
TLDR
These approaches to characterizing folk concepts provide important resources that will supplement, and perhaps in some cases displace, a priori approaches. Expand
THE ORDINARY LANGUAGE BASIS FOR CONTEXTUALISM, AND THE NEW INVARIANTISM
I present the features of the ordinary use of ‘knows’ that make a compelling case for the contextualist account of that verb, and I outline and defend the methodology that takes us from the data to aExpand
Semantics, cross-cultural style
TLDR
Results constitute prima facie evidence that semantic intuitions vary from culture to culture, and the paper argues that this fact raises questions about the nature of the philosophical enterprise of developing a theory of reference. Expand
The Epistemic Side-Effect Effect
Knobe (2003a, 2003b, 2004b) and others have demonstrated the surprising fact that the valence of a side-effect action can affect intuitions about whether that action was performed intentionally. HereExpand
Solving the Skeptical Problem
ed from Nozick's account of knowledge and skepticism. According to SCA, the problem with my belief that I'm not a BIV-and I do have such a belief, as do most of us-is that I would have this beliefExpand
Knowledge and Practical Interests
Introduction 1. Contextualism 2. Knowledge Ascriptions and Gradability 3. Knowledge Ascriptions and Context-Sensitivity 4. Contextualism on the Cheap? 5. Interest-Relative Invariantism 6.Expand
...
1
2
...