Knowledge Isn’t Closed on Saturday: A Study in Ordinary Language

@article{Buckwalter2010KnowledgeIC,
  title={Knowledge Isn’t Closed on Saturday: A Study in Ordinary Language},
  author={Wesley Buckwalter},
  journal={Review of Philosophy and Psychology},
  year={2010},
  volume={1},
  pages={395-406}
}
  • Wesley Buckwalter
  • Published 19 March 2010
  • Philosophy
  • Review of Philosophy and Psychology
Recent theories of epistemic contextualism have challenged traditional invariantist positions in epistemology by claiming that the truth conditions of knowledge attributions fluctuate between conversational contexts. Contextualists often garner support for this view by appealing to folk intuitions regarding ordinary knowledge practices. Proposed is an experiment designed to test the descriptive conditions upon which these types of contextualist defenses rely. In the cases tested, the folk… 

Knowledge and Disagreement

Epistemic contextualism holds that the content of a knowledge sentence of the form ‘S knows that P’ is context sensitive. This view respects the context sensitivity of ordinary speakers’ use of

Epistemic Contextualism: An Idle Hypothesis

ABSTRACT Epistemic contextualism is one of the most hotly debated topics in contemporary epistemology. Contextualists claim that ‘know’ is a context-sensitive verb associated with different

Practical Interests, Relevant Alternatives, and Knowledge Attributions: an Empirical Study

It is argued that the data impugn what both Stanley and Schaffer claim the authors' common-sense judgments about such cases are, and it is indicated that neither raising the possibility of error nor raising stakes moves most people from attributing knowledge to denying it.

Third‐person knowledge ascriptions: A crucial experiment for contextualism

In the past few years there has been a turn towards evaluating the empirical foundation of epistemic contextualism using formal (rather than armchair) experimental methods. By-and-large, the results

Knowledge in Context: The Factivity Principle and Its Epistemological Consequences

The traditional analysis of the notion of knowledge seems to neglect that although we gather many of our beliefs under the flag of “knowledge” we do not always employ the same standards to bestow

Epistemic Contextualism: A Normative Approach

In his Knowledge and Practical Interests Jason Stanley argues that the view he defends, which he calls interest-relative invariantism, is better supported by certain cases than epistemic

Disagreeing with a Skeptic from a Contextualist Point of View

The paper focuses on the problem of how to account for the phenomena of disagreement and retraction in disputes over skepticism in a contextualist framework. I will argue that nonindexical versions

TIME CONSTRAINTS AND PRAGMATIC ENCROACHMENT ON KNOWLEDGE

Abstract Citing some recent experimental findings, I argue for the surprising claim that in some cases the less time you have the more you know. More specifically, I present some evidence to suggest

Knowledge embedded

It is argued that pragmatic invariantists have no principled account of embedded occurrences of ‘S knows/doesn’t know that p’: Occurrences embedded within larger linguistic constructions such as conditional sentences, attitude verbs, expressions of probability, comparatives, and many others give rise to a threefold problem of embedded implicatures.

Does Contextualism Hinge on a Methodological Dispute

Epistemic contextualism (henceforth: contextualism) is, roughly, the semantic thesis that the truthconditional contribution of “knows” vary with variations in the context of utterance. Contextualism
...

References

SHOWING 1-10 OF 18 REFERENCES

Practical Interests, Relevant Alternatives, and Knowledge Attributions: an Empirical Study

It is argued that the data impugn what both Stanley and Schaffer claim the authors' common-sense judgments about such cases are, and it is indicated that neither raising the possibility of error nor raising stakes moves most people from attributing knowledge to denying it.

Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions

In this paper we propose to argue for two claims. The first is that a sizeable group of epistemological projects – a group which includes much of what has been done in epistemology in the analytic

Now you know it, now you don’t

"Contextualism" will here refer to the position that the truth-conditions knowledge-ascribing and knowledge-denying sentences (sentences of the form "S knows that P" and "S doesn't know that P" and

Contextualism and Skepticism

In the good old days, a large part of the debate about skepticism focused on the quality of the reasons we have for believing propositions of various types. Skeptics about knowledge in a given domain

THE ORDINARY LANGUAGE BASIS FOR CONTEXTUALISM, AND THE NEW INVARIANTISM

I present the features of the ordinary use of ‘knows’ that make a compelling case for the contextualist account of that verb, and I outline and defend the methodology that takes us from the data to a

The Epistemic Side-Effect Effect

Knobe (2003a, 2003b, 2004b) and others have demonstrated the surprising fact that the valence of a side-effect action can affect intuitions about whether that action was performed intentionally. Here

Solving the Skeptical Problem

ed from Nozick's account of knowledge and skepticism. According to SCA, the problem with my belief that I'm not a BIV-and I do have such a belief, as do most of us-is that I would have this belief

Knowledge and Practical Interests

Introduction 1. Contextualism 2. Knowledge Ascriptions and Gradability 3. Knowledge Ascriptions and Context-Sensitivity 4. Contextualism on the Cheap? 5. Interest-Relative Invariantism 6.