Knowledge, Understanding and Epistemic Value

  title={Knowledge, Understanding and Epistemic Value},
  author={Duncan Pritchard},
  journal={Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement},
  pages={19 - 43}
  • D. Pritchard
  • Published 27 May 2009
  • Philosophy
  • Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement
It is a widespread pre-theoretical intuition that knowledge is distinctively valuable. If this were not so, then it would be simply mysterious why knowledge has been the focus of so much of epistemological theorising, rather than some other epistemic standing like justified true belief. Given this fact, however, it is obviously important to a theory of knowledge that it is able to offer a good explanation of why we have this intuition. Indeed, some, such as Jonathan Kvanvig (2003) and Timothy… 

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