Know-How Disclosure and Incomplete Contracts

@inproceedings{Rosenkranz1999KnowHowDA,
  title={Know-How Disclosure and Incomplete Contracts},
  author={Stephanie Rosenkranz and Patrick W. Schmitz},
  year={1999}
}

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