Know-How Disclosure and Incomplete Contracts

@inproceedings{Rosenkranz1999KnowHowDA,
  title={Know-How Disclosure and Incomplete Contracts},
  author={S. Rosenkranz and P. Schmitz},
  year={1999}
}
When two parties invest in human capital and at the same time decide on know-how disclosure it can be shown that joint ownership with veto power is the optimal ownership structure, given that only incomplete contracts can be written. 
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Optimal Allocation of Ownership Rights in Dynamic R&D Alliances
Breach Remedies Inducing Hybrid Investments
On Synergies and Vertical Integration
Information Gathering, Transaction Costs, and the Property Rights Approach
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