Knapsack Voting for Participatory Budgeting

@article{Goel2019KnapsackVF,
  title={Knapsack Voting for Participatory Budgeting},
  author={A. Goel and A. Krishnaswamy and Sukolsak Sakshuwong and Tanja Aitamurto},
  journal={ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation (TEAC)},
  year={2019},
  volume={7},
  pages={1 - 27}
}
  • A. Goel, A. Krishnaswamy, +1 author Tanja Aitamurto
  • Published 2019
  • Computer Science
  • ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation (TEAC)
  • We address the question of aggregating the preferences of voters in the context of participatory budgeting. We scrutinize the voting method currently used in practice, underline its drawbacks, and introduce a novel scheme tailored to this setting, which we call “Knapsack Voting.” We study its strategic properties—we show that it is strategy-proof under a natural model of utility (a dis-utility given by the ℓ1 distance between the outcome and the true preference of the voter) and “partially… CONTINUE READING
    23 Citations
    Participatory Budgeting: Models and Approaches
    • 11
    • Highly Influenced
    • PDF
    Proportionally Representative Participatory Budgeting with Ordinal Preferences
    • 1
    • PDF
    Funding Public Projects: A Case for the Nash Product Rule
    • 3
    • PDF
    District-Fair Participatory Budgeting
    • 1
    • PDF
    Fair division of the commons
    • 3
    Voting to select projects in participatory budgeting
    • 1

    References

    SHOWING 1-2 OF 2 REFERENCES
    The Problem of Strategic Behavior under Approval Voting
    • 97
    • Highly Influential
    CONDORCET'S THEORY OF VOTING
    • 674
    • Highly Influential
    • PDF