Corpus ID: 9240674

Knapsack Voting : Voting mechanisms for Participatory Budgeting

@inproceedings{Goel2016KnapsackV,
  title={Knapsack Voting : Voting mechanisms for Participatory Budgeting},
  author={Ashish Goel and A. Krishnaswamy and Sukolsak Sakshuwong and Tanja Aitamurto},
  year={2016}
}
We address the question of aggregating the preferences of voters in the context of participatory budgeting. We scrutinize the voting method currently used in practice, underline its drawbacks, and introduce a novel scheme tailored to this setting, which we call “Knapsack Voting”. We study its strategic properties we show that it is strategy-proof under a natural model of utility (a dis-utility given by the `1 distance between the outcome and the true preference of the voter), and “partially… Expand
Truthful Aggregation of Budget Proposals
Portioning Using Ordinal Preferences: Fairness and Efficiency
Proportionality Degree of Multiwinner Rules
Proportional Participatory Budgeting with Substitute Projects
Fair Knapsack
Iterative Local Voting for Collective Decision-making in Continuous Spaces
Participatory Budgeting with Donations and Diversity Constraints
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