Kleptocracy and Divide-and-Rule: A Model of Personal Rule

  title={Kleptocracy and Divide-and-Rule: A Model of Personal Rule},
  author={Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson and Thierry Verdier},
  journal={MIT Economics Department Working Paper Series},
Many developing countries have suffered under the personal rule of kleptocrats, who implement highly inefficient economic policies, expropriate the wealth of their citizens, and use the proceeds for their own glorification or consumption. We argue that the success of kleptocrats rests, in part, on their ability to use a divide-and-rule strategy, made possible by the weakness of institutions in these societies. Members of society need to cooperate in order to depose a kleptocrat, yet such… 


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