Kleptocracy and Divide-and-Rule: A Model of Personal Rule

@article{Acemoglu2003KleptocracyAD,
  title={Kleptocracy and Divide-and-Rule: A Model of Personal Rule},
  author={D. Acemoglu and James A. Robinson and T. Verdier},
  journal={Political Economy (Topic)},
  year={2003}
}
  • D. Acemoglu, James A. Robinson, T. Verdier
  • Published 2003
  • Economics, Political Science
  • Political Economy (Topic)
Many developing countries have suffered under the personal rule of kleptocrats, who implement highly inefficient economic policies, expropriate the wealth of their citizens, and use the proceeds for their own glorification or consumption. We argue that the success of kleptocrats rests, in part, on their ability to use a divide-and-rule strategy, made possible by the weakness of institutions in these societies. Members of society need to cooperate in order to depose a kleptocrat, yet such… Expand
488 Citations
Economics of Corruption by Democracy
  • 1
Corruption and paradoxes in alliances
  • 1
Political Accountability in Divided Societies : The Politics of Fear
  • 6
  • PDF
Inequality, extractive institutions, and growth in nondemocratic regimes
  • 4
  • Highly Influenced
  • PDF
Political Specialization
  • 1
  • Highly Influenced
  • PDF
...
1
2
3
4
5
...

References

SHOWING 1-10 OF 95 REFERENCES
Why not a political Coase theorem? Social conflict, commitment, and politics
  • 323
  • PDF
Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy
  • 2,822
  • PDF
The Elusive Quest for Growth: Economists' Adventures and Misadventures in the Tropics
  • 1,367
  • PDF
The political economy of dictatorship
  • 939
The Logic of Political Survival
  • 3,282
  • PDF
Political Losers as a Barrier to Economic Development
  • 425
  • PDF
Positive theories of congressional institutions
  • 435
  • PDF
The Economic Effects of Constitutions
  • 787
...
1
2
3
4
5
...