Kidney exchange in dynamic sparse heterogenous pools

@article{Ashlagi2013KidneyEI,
  title={Kidney exchange in dynamic sparse heterogenous pools},
  author={Itai Ashlagi and Patrick Jaillet and Vahideh H. Manshadi},
  journal={ArXiv},
  year={2013},
  volume={abs/1301.3509}
}
The need for kidney exchange arises when a healthy person wishes to donate a kidney but is incompatible with her intended recipient. Two main factors determine compatibility of a donor with a patient: blood-type compatibility and tissue-type compatibility. Two or more incompatible pairs can form a cyclic exchange so that each patient can receive a kidney from a compatible donor. In addition, an exchange can be initiated by a non-directed donor (an altruistic donor who does not designate a… 

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