Keyboard acoustic emanations

@article{Asonov2004KeyboardAE,
  title={Keyboard acoustic emanations},
  author={Dmitri Asonov and Rakesh Agrawal},
  journal={IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, 2004. Proceedings. 2004},
  year={2004},
  pages={3-11}
}
  • Dmitri Asonov, R. Agrawal
  • Published 9 May 2004
  • Computer Science
  • IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, 2004. Proceedings. 2004
We show that PC keyboards, notebook keyboards, telephone and ATM pads are vulnerable to attacks based on differentiating the sound emanated by different keys. Our attack employs a neural network to recognize the key being pressed. We also investigate why different keys produce different sounds and provide hints for the design of homophonic keyboards that would be resistant to this type of attack. 
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