Keep Your Promise: Mechanism Design Against Free-Riding and False-Reporting in Crowdsourcing

@article{Zhang2015KeepYP,
  title={Keep Your Promise: Mechanism Design Against Free-Riding and False-Reporting in Crowdsourcing},
  author={Xiang Zhang and G. Xue and Ruozhou Yu and D. Yang and J. Tang},
  journal={IEEE Internet of Things Journal},
  year={2015},
  volume={2},
  pages={562-572}
}
Crowdsourcing is an emerging paradigm where users can have their tasks completed by paying fees, or receive rewards for providing service. A critical problem that arises in current crowdsourcing mechanisms is how to ensure that users pay or receive what they deserve. Free-riding and false-reporting may make the system vulnerable to dishonest users. In this paper, we design schemes to tackle these problems, so that each individual in the system is better off being honest and each provider… Expand
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