Kantian non-conceptualism

  title={Kantian non-conceptualism},
  author={Robert Hanna},
  journal={Philosophical Studies},
There are perceptual states whose representational content cannot even in principle be conceptual. If that claim is true, then at least some perceptual states have content whose semantic structure and psychological function are essentially distinct from the structure and function of conceptual content. Furthermore the intrinsically “orientable” spatial character of essentially non-conceptual content entails not only that all perceptual states contain non-conceptual content in this essentially… 

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Must Conceptually Informed Perceptual Experience Involve Non-Conceptual Content?

  • S. Sedivy
  • Philosophy, Psychology
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy
  • 1996
The idea of nonconceptual contents proposes that there are mental contents at the level of the experiencing person that are individuated independently of ‘anything to do with the mind.’ Such contents

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