KNOWLEDGE, OBJECTS AND INTERESTS

@inproceedings{Keat2013KNOWLEDGEOA,
  title={KNOWLEDGE, OBJECTS AND INTERESTS},
  author={Russell Keat},
  year={2013}
}
  • Russell Keat
  • Published 2013
Habermas’s theory of knowledge-constitutive interests (initially outlined in the Introduction) is intended to challenge what he regards as the ‘false objectivism’ of positivism’s conception of science and the relationship between theory and practice. This objectivism has two related elements. First, there is the belief that the objects of scientific knowledge exist independently of the epistemological framework on the basis of which they are investigated. Second, there is the claim that such… CONTINUE READING

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