KASLR is Dead: Long Live KASLR

  title={KASLR is Dead: Long Live KASLR},
  author={Daniel Gruss and Moritz Lipp and Michael Schwarz and Richard Fellner and Cl{\'e}mentine Maurice and Stefan Mangard},
Modern operating system kernels employ address space layout randomization (ASLR) to prevent control-flow hijacking attacks and code-injection attacks. While kernel security relies fundamentally on preventing access to address information, recent attacks have shown that the hardware directly leaks this information. Strictly splitting kernel space and user space has recently been proposed as a theoretical concept to close these side channels. However, this is not trivially possible due to… CONTINUE READING
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Shutemov: Pagemap: Do Not Leak Physical Addresses to Non-Privileged Userspace

  • A. Kirill
  • https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git…
  • 2015
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