Justifying Conditionalization : Conditionalization Maximizes Expected Epistemic Utility

@inproceedings{Greaves2005JustifyingC,
  title={Justifying Conditionalization : Conditionalization Maximizes Expected Epistemic Utility},
  author={H. R. G. Greaves and D. Wallace},
  year={2005}
}
According to Bayesian epistemology, the epistemically rational agent updates her beliefs by conditionalization: that is, her posterior subjective probability after taking account of evidence X, Pnew, is to be set equal to her prior conditional probability Pold('X). Bayesians can be challenged to provide a justification for their claim that conditionalization is recommended by rationality-whence the normative force of the injunction to conditionalize? There are several existing justifications… CONTINUE READING

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