Justified representation in approval-based committee voting

@article{Aziz2014JustifiedRI,
  title={Justified representation in approval-based committee voting},
  author={Haris Aziz and Markus Brill and Toby Walsh},
  journal={Social Choice and Welfare},
  year={2014},
  volume={48},
  pages={461-485}
}
We consider approval-based committee voting, i.e. the setting where each voter approves a subset of candidates, and these votes are then used to select a fixed-size set of winners (committee). We propose a natural axiom for this setting, which we call justified representation ($$\mathrm {JR}$$JR). This axiom requires that if a large enough group of voters exhibits agreement by supporting the same candidate, then at least one voter in this group has an approved candidate in the winning committee… 
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The main result is to show that stable lotteries always exist for these canonical preference models, given preferences of voters over committees, and the procedure for computing an approximately stable lottery is the same for both models.
Group Fairness in Committee Selection
TLDR
The main result is to show that stable lotteries always exist for these canonical voter preference models, and the procedure for computing an approximately stable lottery is the same for both models and therefore extends to the setting where some voters have the former preference structure and others have the latter.
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We investigate approval-based committee voting with incomplete information about voters’ approval preferences. We consider several models of incompleteness where each voter partitions the set of
The Excess Method: A Multiwinner Approval Voting Procedure to Allocate Wasted Votes
In using approval voting to elect multiple winners to a committee or council, it is desirable that excess votes — approvals beyond those that a candidate needs to win a seat — not be wasted. The
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