Juking the Stats? Authoritarian Information Problems in China

@article{Wallace2014JukingTS,
  title={Juking the Stats? Authoritarian Information Problems in China},
  author={Jeremy L. Wallace},
  journal={British Journal of Political Science},
  year={2014},
  volume={46},
  pages={11 - 29}
}
  • J. Wallace
  • Published 5 June 2014
  • Political Science
  • British Journal of Political Science
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