Judicial Independence and the Rationing of Constitutional Remedies

  title={Judicial Independence and the Rationing of Constitutional Remedies},
  author={Aziz Huq},
  journal={Duke Law Journal},
  • Aziz Huq
  • Published 2015
  • Economics
  • Duke Law Journal
  • This Article analyzes the doctrinal instruments federal courts use to allocate scarce adjudicative resources over competing demands for constitutional remedies. It advances two claims. The first is that a central, hitherto underappreciated, doctrinal instrument for rationing judicial resources is a demand that most constitutional claimants demonstrate that an official violated an exceptionally clear, unambiguous constitutional rule — that is, not only that the Constitution was violated, but… CONTINUE READING
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