Corpus ID: 209832242

Judicial Favoritism of Politicians: Evidence from Small Claims Court

@article{Assumpcao2020JudicialFO,
  title={Judicial Favoritism of Politicians: Evidence from Small Claims Court},
  author={Andre Assumpcao and J. Trecenti},
  journal={arXiv: General Economics},
  year={2020}
}
Multiple studies have documented racial, gender, political ideology, or ethnical biases in comparative judicial systems. Supplementing this literature, we investigate whether judges rule cases differently when one of the litigants is a politician. We suggest a theory of power collusion, according to which judges might use rulings to buy cooperation or threaten members of the other branches of government. We test this theory using a sample of small claims cases in the state of S\~ao Paulo… Expand

Figures and Tables from this paper

References

SHOWING 1-10 OF 35 REFERENCES
The Logic of Strategic Defection: Court–Executive Relations in Argentina Under Dictatorship and Democracy
The Puzzling (In)Dependence of Courts: A Comparative Approach
Do Judges Vary in Their Treatment of Race?
Racial Bias in Bail Decisions
Judicial Checks and Balances
Is There a Politically Optimal Level of Judicial Independence?
Independent Courts and Administrative Agencies: An Empirical Analysis of the States
...
1
2
3
4
...