Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases

  title={Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases},
  author={A. Tversky and D. Kahneman},
  pages={1124 - 1131}
This article described three heuristics that are employed in making judgements under uncertainty: (i) representativeness, which is usually employed when people are asked to judge the probability that an object or event A belongs to class or process B; (ii) availability of instances or scenarios, which is often employed when people are asked to assess the frequency of a class or the plausibility of a particular development; and (iii) adjustment from an anchor, which is usually employed in… Expand
Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases.
Three heuristics that are employed in making judgements under uncertainty are described: representativeness, availability of instances or scenarios, which is often employed when people are asked to assess the frequency of a class or the plausibility of a particular development. Expand
Bias and decision making – an overview systems explanation
ABSTRACT People are continuously making decisions, most of a minor nature, but also some of significance. Few people seem to enquire as to the basis of their decisions or as to why one decision isExpand
Characteristics of a Process for Subjective Probability Elicitation
The characteristics of a good elicitation process are synthesised by critically reviewing those advocated and applied by comparing the processes inherent in the guidance produced by two professional bodies to exemplify the manner in which the characteristics manifest themselves in practice. Expand
Politicians, the Representativeness Heuristic and Decision-Making Biases
Do politicians use the representativeness heuristic when making judgements, that is, when they appraise the likelihood or frequency of an outcome that is unknown or unknowable? Heuristics areExpand
Inexperienced decision-makers' use of positive heuristics for marketing decisions
PurposeResearch has reliably demonstrated that decision-makers, especially expert ones, use heuristics to make decisions under uncertainty. However, whether decision-makers with little or noExpand
People as Intuitive Scientists: Reconsidering Statistical Explanations of Decision Making
This work suggests a theoretical reorientation away from assuming people's representations towards a focus on explaining how people themselves specify what is important to represent, and casts decision makers as intuitive scientists able to flexibly construct, modify, and replace the representations of the decision problems they face. Expand
A Unified Theory of Human Judgements and Decision-Making under Uncertainty
A unified theoretical perspective is proposed which applies the mathematical formalism of quantum theory in Hilbert space to cognitive domains and explains how the quantum-theoretic framework works in a variety of judgement and decision situations where systematic and significant deviations from classicality occur. Expand
The environmental malleability of base-rate neglect
It is suggested that people use and integrate all of the information provided to them to make judgements, but heavily prioritize information that is causal in nature because people are sensitive to the underlying causal structures in their environment and adapt their decision making as such. Expand
Advice taking under uncertainty: The impact of genuine advice versus arbitrary anchors on judgment
Abstract A major module of rational advice taking consists in the metacognitive ability to distinguish between credible advice and arbitrary anchors. Accordingly, we investigated the extent to whichExpand
Errors, fast and slow: an analysis of response times in probability judgments
Abstract Based on the Dual-Process Diffusion Model, we tested three hypotheses about response times of errors and correct responses in probability judgments. We predicted that correct responses wereExpand


The Foundations of Statistics (Wiley
  • New York,
  • 1954