Judgment aggregation with consistency alone

@inproceedings{Dietrich2007JudgmentAW,
  title={Judgment aggregation with consistency alone},
  author={Franz Dietrich and Christian List},
  year={2007}
}
All existing impossibility theorems on judgment aggregation require individual and collective judgment sets to be consistent and complete (in some recent results with completeness relaxed to deductive closure), arguably a demanding rationality requirement. They do not carry over to aggregation functions mapping profiles of (merely) consistent individual judgment sets to (merely) consistent collective ones. We prove that, whenever the agenda of propositions under consideration exhibits mild… CONTINUE READING

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