Judgment Extremity and Accuracy Under Epistemic vs. Aleatory Uncertainty

@article{Tannenbaum2017JudgmentEA,
  title={Judgment Extremity and Accuracy Under Epistemic vs. Aleatory Uncertainty},
  author={David Tannenbaum and Craig R. Fox and G{\"u}lden {\"U}lk{\"u}men},
  journal={Manag. Sci.},
  year={2017},
  volume={63},
  pages={497-518}
}
People view uncertain events as knowable in principle (epistemic uncertainty), as fundamentally random (aleatory uncertainty), or as some mixture of the two. We show that people make more extreme probability judgments (i.e., closer to 0 or 1) for events they view as entailing more epistemic uncertainty and less aleatory uncertainty. We demonstrate this pattern in a domain where there is agreement concerning the balance of evidence (pairings of teams according to their seed in a basketball… 

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