Judged frequency of lethal events

  title={Judged frequency of lethal events},
  author={S. Lichtenstein and P. Slovic and B. Fischhoff and M. Layman and Barbara Combs},
  journal={Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Learning \& Memory},
A series of 5 experiments with 660 adult Ss studied how people judge the frequency of death from various causes. The judgments exhibited a highly consistent but systematically biased subjective scale of frequency. Two kinds of bias were identified: (a) a tendency to overestimate small frequencies and underestimate larger ones; and (b) a tendency to exaggerate the frequency of some specific causes and to underestimate the frequency of others, at any given level of objective frequency. These… Expand
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  • Risk analysis : an official publication of the Society for Risk Analysis
  • 2002
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