Joining the Club: Accession to the GATT/WTO

@article{Davis2017JoiningTC,
  title={Joining the Club: Accession to the GATT/WTO},
  author={C. Davis and Meredith Wilf},
  journal={The Journal of Politics},
  year={2017},
  volume={79},
  pages={964 - 978}
}
Which states join international institutions? Existing theories of the multilateral trade regime, the GATT/WTO, emphasize gains from cooperation on substantive policies regulated by the institution. We argue that political ties rather than issue-area functional gains determine who joins, and we show how geopolitical alignment shapes the demand and supply sides of membership. Discretionary accession rules allow members to selectively recruit some countries in pursuit of foreign policy goals, and… Expand
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